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ABSTRACT
This paper demonstrates that different rates of taxation on interest
income and exchange gains may bias results of hypothesis testing regarding
critical aspects of exchange rate behavior. Two problems are discussed
specifically. First, it is shown that omission of tax considerations may
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a "risk premium" hypothesis, conditional on exchange market efficiency.
Second it is shown that a rational solution for the exchange rate condi—
tions the relationship between an exchange rate and its determinants on
two regimes: (1) tax rates on interest income and foreign exchange gains
and losses at home and abroad and (2) the degree of foreign exchange
market intervention and sterilization of its effects on the monetary base
practiced by central banks.
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Empirical studies ofexchangerate behavior during the first decade of
'floating' have suggested that exchange rates behave much like 'prices' in
other asset markets: they are hard to 'explain' inside sample periods and
virtually impossible to predict outside sample periods. These problems
have been examined by, among others, Makin (1982) and by Meese and Rogoff
(1983). The former examines theoretical bases for exchange rate
forecasting difficulties and shows how policy—regime changes may be partly
responsible while the latter shows that the out—of—sample performance of a
broad class of empirical exchange rate models fails to yield any
improvement over the random walk model. Among the culprits suggested by
Meese and Rogoff to explain such dismal performance are money demand
specifications, volatile time—varying risk premiums, volatile long run real
exchange rates and poor measurement of inflationary expectations.
This paper examines the possibility that another culprit may be
lurking in the structure that underlies exchange rate equations: tax
asymmetries. Specifically, the possibility exists, first examined by Levi
(1977), that different rates of taxation on interest income and exchange
gains may bias results of hypothesis testing regarding critical aspects of
exchange rate behavior.
Two examples are considered in this paper. First, it is shown that
tests of the uncovered interest parity condition——nominal interest
differential equals the expected change in the exchange rate——may be biased
by omission of tax considerations. Such tests in turn carry important
implications for a number of theoretical and policy issues. Significant
deviations from uncovered interest parity are consistent with either
foreign exchange market inefficiency, time varying risk premiums or both.
1In turn the existence of varying risk premiums is consistent with imperfect
substitutability between assets denominated in different currencies and,
tbereby—--given risk aversion—---with a significant effect on exchange rates
ofsterilized intervention.1
The secondimplication of tax treatment of interest income and
exchange gains for empirical investigation of exchange rate behavior
concerns estimation of exchange rate equations per se. Inclusion of an
after—tax uncovered interest parity equation among the structural equations
employed to derive a reduced—form expression for the equilibrium exchange
rate embeds marginal tax rates——which may vary over tIme——In the
coefficients that measure the impact upon the exchange rate of actual and
expected changes in the variables that in turn determine the exchange rate.
Therefore, empirical specifications of exchange rate equations which assume
constant coefficients over some sample period may prove inadequate if
effective marginal tax rates on interest income and exchange gains vary
either absolutely or relative to each other over the sample period. Such
possible variation in tax rates is also suggestive of a reason for poor
post—sample performance of many exchange rate equations. In short a fiscal
version of the 'Lucas critique' may apply to exchange rate equations.
However, changes in effective marginal tax rates may be strictly exogenous
and thereby suggestive of a means to improve the fit of exchange rate
equations while testing an hypothesized impact from observable changes in
tax rates on estimated coefficients in an exchange rate equation.
Viewed broadly, there are really two non—contradictory approaches to
improving the fit of exchange rate equations emerging from the extensive
and often innovative empirical investigations of exchange rate behavior
over the past decade.2 One is an 'omitted variables' approach related to
examination of residuals of uncovered interest parity, purchasing power
2parity and, possibly, money demand equations while the other—--related to
possible changes in tax rates as well as to possible changes in
interventionand/or sterilization policy (see Makin (1981, 1982,1983))——
amounts to anhypothesis that reduced—form coefficients in exchange rate
equationsmay vary over time. Empirical tests under both approaches may be
biased by failing to specify uncovered interest parity in after—tax terms.
Thispaper identifies such possible biases and suggests some possible ways
to eliminate them.
At the outset it should be made clear that the aim here is not to
suggest that 'taxes are everything' or that all prior work that ignores tax
considerations is invalid. That is not the case and, as we shall see, the
evidence that after—tax covered interest parity always differs from before—
tax covered interest parity is mixed at best. Rather the aim of this paper
is more modest:to add to the list of possible reasons for poor empirical
performance of exchange rate equations the need to consider changes over
time in effective marginal tax rates on interest income and exchange gains.
I.L!Investiaationsof Uncovered Intere*t Parity
Investigations like Loopesko (1983) of possible realized profits from
uncovered positions in assets denominated in different currencies jointly
test two hypotheses: efficiency of foreign exchange markets and absence of
a systematic risk premium or, equivalently, perfect substitutability among
assets denominated in different currencies. It is shown here that tests of
theefficiency—perfect substitutes (hereafter epa) joint hypothesis are
conditional on the ratio of marginal tax rates applied to foreign exchange
gainsversus ordinary income. If those rates differ, examination of before
3tax realized profits from uncovered positions will be biased toward
rejection of the eps joint hypothesis.
First we derive an after—tax covered interest parity equation from
which can be derived an expression for realized profits on uncovered
positions that enables empirical testing of the eps joint hypothesis.
After—tax covered interest parity for country 1 investors is written as:3
(1) (1 +i1)= (1+i2)(l—t)(Ft/S)(l---rk) t t
where: nominal interest rate in country 1 at time t.
t
=nominalinterest rate in country 2 at time t.
Ft =forwardexchange rate: currency 1 price of currency 2 at
time t for delivery at t+1 (one year ahead.)
St spot exchange rate at time t.
=marginaltax rate on interest income in country 1.
=marginaltax rate on exchange gains in country 1.
Taking logs of both sides of (1) and rearranging terms gives:
(2) i1 —i2= tt
where ln(1+i)i for small i.
=logof the forward rate at time t.
=logof the spot rate at time t.
(l_Tk) >-Oasr-.
(1—i)<
Equation(2) says simply that if the tax on exchange gains k is less than
the tax on interest income then the interest differential between countries
1 and 2 will exceed the exchange gain or loss. Obviously if c, the
4considerations washout and before and after—tax covered interest parity
conditions are identical.
In most cases, the tax on exchange gains is below the income tax rate.
See Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co. (1979) for a full discussion. For U.S.
corporations r1 =0.30for positions held more than 12 months while =
0.48so that =1.35.In practice actual marginal income tax rates for
corporations as well as households may be lower and may vary considerably
over time. (See Tanzi (1982) and Estrella and Fuhrer (1983)).
Traditionally, deviations from covered interest parity expressed by
equation (2) have been attributed to political risk and/or portfolio
balance considerations.4 Some current studies such as Ito (1983) have
found results for Japan—U.S. which are generally consistent with =1.0
during the 1975—80 period and consistent with < 1.0 thereafter. < 1.0
is consistent with r > rk, contrary to expectations based on the U.S. tax
code. In contrast, Katz (1983) reports results for the United States and
seven industrial countries which suggest> 1.0 over the short run which
is another odd result, since usually short run exchange gains are taxed at
the same rate as interest income. Katz's results may be due partly to
measurement error since he in effect uses expected inflation differentials
to measure expected depreciation——thereby hypothesizing satisfaction of
purchasing power parity——and then estimates what amounts to an uncovered
interest parity equation. In sum, empirical evidence onis inconclusive
at this stage and probably deserves closer examinaiton with prior
hypotheses modified to reflect the realities of the tax code.
Equation (2) can be employed to derive an expression for realized
profits on uncovered 'foreign asset positions.If assets denominated in
currencies 1 and 2 are imperfect substitutes, a risk premium, RPt0,
5separates the log of the forward rate, from the log of the expected
spot rate——at time t for time t+1, Se+l.
'3) f —S+RPe t_t t+1
Likewise, a forecast error, e, separates the actual spot rate at time t+1
from tS t+i•
(4) S1 =
Substitutingfrom (3) and (4) into (2) gives:
—i2
=[St+i—S+e+
Anexpresion for pre—tax realized profits, xt (the residual of uncovered
interest parity) is given by subtracting the actual percent change in the
exchange rate from both sides of (5):
(6) xt (i1—i2) —(S+i—S)
=(—1)(S+i—S)+[8t+RPet).
It is clear from equation (6) that pre and after—tax realized profits
are identical only if l with tkr. Otherwise x is an upwardly biased
measure of realized profits or losses resulting in a bias toward rejection
of the eps joint hypothesis.5 Given 3 > 1 a rise in the spot rate creates
an upwardly biased measure of true (after—tax) profits while a fall in the
spot rate overstates true losses.
III. Ipact of T*xes on Obaervablo Exchan*e Rate Behavior
Here a rational expression for the equilibrium exchange rate is
derived from a simple structure including money demand equations in two
countries, purchasing power parity (which can be expanded to allow for
'real' exchange rate changes) and the after—tax, expanded uncovered
6interest parity equation (5).We also allow for official exchange market
intervention and presence or absence of sterilization of effects of
intervention on the monetary base.
The solution to the two country model after some algebra and iterative
substitution is a parametizod expression for the exchange rate in ternis of:
relative (exogenous portions of) money supplies, relative real output, a
risk premium term that allows for consideration of assets that are
imperfect substitutes and 'real' exchange rate changes. Parameters which
determine the exchange rate in terms of current actual and expected future
values of these variables include the income and interest elasticities of
money demand in each country, degree of sterilization and intervention in
each country and——of particular significance for the investigation proposed
here——tax rates on interest income and foreign exchange gains and losses in
each country.
The model can be estimated by specifying a time series process to
determine future expected behavior of exogenous variables, Following
BjJson(1979)and Makjn (1981, 1983), for example, one can define growth of
exogenousvariables(log first differences) as an AR—i process.
A basic solution employing the procedure just outlined, following
Makin (1981, 1983) is obtained as follows. Based on log linear money
demand equations in countries '1' and '2,' purchasing power parity and
deviations therefrom ('real' exchange rate changes) an expression for the
log of the spot exchange rate may be written as
(7) = — ay+ dz + b(i1 i2 )+Ut
where:
=logof spot exchange rate (currency 1 price of currency 2).
7= logof exogenous portion of monetary base in country 1 less
log of exogenous portion of monetary base in country 2.
=logof real income in country 1 less log of real income in
country 2.
z =vectorof disturbances which systematically cause deviations
from purchasing power parity.
ih(h—l,Z) =thenominal interest rate in country h.
u =disturbanceterm in money demand equation for country 1
less same term for country 2.
a =incomeelastIcity of money demand In country 1 (set equal
to that in country 2).
b interest elasticity of money demand in countries 1 and 2.
(Note:'a' and 'b' can be allowed to differ across
countries.)
=aterm capturing sterilization and intervention behavior
in countries 1 and 2.(4'O with free floating and no
intervention in foreign exchange markets.See Makin
(1981) for full derivation.)




Substituting iteratively to solve for se+1 equation (8) becomes:
=1+b-1+b-tt+j








Equation(5) describes the spot exchange rate as being determined——in
a manner set by parameters and tax rates——by current actual and expected
future values of the set of exogenous variables, de, ,zand RP° defined
above.
A primary conclusion from the discussion of exchange rate
determination summarized in equation (5) is the implied effect on the
exchange rate of current and prospective policies regarding intervention,
sterilization and tax rates applied to interest earnings and to foreign
exchange gains and losses. Announcement of expected future changes in such
policies will change the current equilibrium spot rate in the forward—
looking foreign exchange market even if current and prospective values
exognous variables remain unchanged.
Ofparticular interest in view of the forward—looking nature of the
asset marketsin which exchange rates are determined is the exact nature of
the impact upon exchange rates of changes in=[(l—rk)/(l—r)l.The
essential point emerges from examination of equation (8). As rises——
given >1——the term describing the impact on the exchange rate of current,
actual changes in exogenous variables [l/(l+b—4)} unambiguously falls in
value while the current impact on the exchange rate of expected future
shocks rises.6 In other words, tax policy which taxes interest income at
higher rates than it does exchange gains may result in more volatile
9exchange rates, particularly if changes in expectations about future values
of exchange rate determinants are larger than changes in current actual
values of the same determinants. Amplification or dampening by tax policy
of exchange rate effects of changes in the more volatile——expected future——
portion of exchange rate determinants may occur over time as effective
marginal tax rates vary over time or across countries as tax treatment of
interest income versus exchange gains varies, from country to country.7
A corollary to these propositions about the effects of tax rate
changes on exchange rate volatility concerns a serious implied problem for
estimation of exchange rate equations. In particular, sample periods that
span changes in tax rates and/or changes in intervention or sterilization
policies will produce poor fits since the true values of coefficients
attached to exogenous variables will vary with such changes. Estimation
procedures may be called for that allow coefficients in the exchange rate
equation to vary over time. A time series on effective marginal tax rates
amounts, in this context, to a time series on 'regime changes' required to
identify an equation incorporating rational expectations. It would also be
necessary to control for changes in intervention and/or sterilization
policy under this procedure.
JPreliminaryTests: Variable Coefficients in
EstimatedExcbane Rate Equations
Themodelderived in Section III suggests that coefficients describing
the impact on the exchange rate of the explanatory variables in equation
(9) will varyover timeas tax rates and steril ization/intervention p01 icy
changesovertime. It will therefore be necessary to obtain detailing
information on effective marginal tax rates over time as well as on any
major changes in sterilization/intervention policy at major central banks
10since the advent of 'floating' in March of 1973. In particular, it would
be necessary first to identify sample periods during which, say, American
and 'foreign' sterilization/intervention policy remained reasonably stable
as a background against which to test prior hypotheses about the effects of
tax rate changes.
The task of identifying episodes of stable sterilization and
intervention policy may be eased somewhat by the efforts of the Working
Group on Exchange Market Intervention established at Versailles in June,
1982.Since early 1981 American policy has been particularly stable with
virtually no intervention undertaken except, apparently, after the
President was shot and on a very limited basis after mid—1983. Under such
circumstances it is only necessary to identify sharp changes in
sterilization/intervention policy by other major central banks in order to
control for 'non—tax' sources of regime changes.If, for example, it were
possible to document a period of stable sterilization/intervention policy
by Japan or Germany that coincided with a period of little American
official intervention in exchange markets, the conditions necessary to test
hypotheses about the exchange—rate—equation—coefficient effects of tax rate
changes would be largely met.
Withsample period selection to control for sterilization/intervention
policy changes completed, examination of the effect of tax rate changes
requires time series on effective marginal tax rates on interest income and
exchangegains in countries on both sides of a bilateral exchange market:
in particular, American and 'other' country tax rates in order to examine
tax effects on the dollar price of major currencies. Most desirable would
be a country where both interest income and exchange gains are taxed at the
same rate and where a relatively straightforward tax code results——barring
11exogenously legislated changes which could be identified and allowed for——
in fairly constant effective marginal tax rates over time. Japan is such a
country, and it possesses the added attraction of focussing attention on
the key yen—dollar rate which some feel has behaved strangely at times.
Germany may also fulfill these objectives and conditions.
Controlling for official intervention and non—United States tax
policy, it then becomes possible to examine the impact on exchange rate
behavior——by way of effects on the coefficients specified in equation (9)——
of changes over time in effective, American, marginal, tax rates on
interest income. This is made possible by two factors. Tax rates on
realized exchange gains for positions held over a year have been constant
at 30 percent.8 Specific time series oneffective marginal tax rates on
interest income have been calculated by Tanzi (1982). Taken together these
are sufficient to identify prior hypotheses on the movement over time of
coefficients in equation (9).
Preliminary results of estimating equation (9) for the yen—dollar
exchange rate fail to contradict the hypothesis that the true value of its
coefficients ought to vary over time. It is too soon, however, to say
anything definite about the exact manner in which the coefficients vary
over time or whether such variation is consistent with that suggested by
the actual behavior over time of effective U.S. marginal tax rates.
Further examination of the yen—dollar rate and the DM—dollar rate is
underway.
Concluding Remarks
Beyond the intrinsically difficult nature of problems associated with
estimating equations determining asset prices in forward—looking markets,
many barriers to successful identification of reasonable stable exchange
12rate equations remain. All of the unresolved questions surrounding a
formidable list of problems——specification of money demand equations, real
exchange rate movements, time—varying risk premia, market efficiency——
remain to plague exchange rate equations even before addressing problems
tied to regime changes linked to changes in intervention policy or
effective marginal tax rates. Enumeration of these difficulties amounts to
no more than another way of saying that the dismal performance of exchange
rate equations whch leave some or all of such problems nnaddressed——ably
documented by Meese and Rogoff (1983)——sbould come as no surprise.
Overall, the discussion presented here suggests that a good deal of
'work remains to be done on estimating exchange rate equations that allow
for in—sample structural shifts. Changes over time in effective tax
rates——evident from time series data for such rates in the tT.S.—---suggest
that allowing for such changes may improve the fit of exchange rate
equations. Encouraging results of such tests for interest rate behavior
have already appeared in Peek and Wilcox (1983).
13FOOThOTES
1.See Henderson et al. (1984) for a discussion of evidence on imperfect
substitutability. Onefficiency and related hypotheses see Hansen and
Hodrick (1980).
2.For an excellent 'review of the troops' see the volumes edited by
Frenkel (1983) and Hawkins, Levich and Wihlborg (1982).
3.If country 2 has an asymmetric tax treatment of exchange gains and
interest income then equation (1) may hold without satisfying covered
interest parity for country 2. This case is examined for Canada and
the United States by Levi (1977).Such asymmetry raises the
possibility of simultaneous two way capital flows and also raises an
interesting question of bow long run equilibrium is achieved. For now
we assume that countries 1 and 2 have symmetric tax systems so that
equation (1) describes covered interest parity for both or,
alternatively that country 1 is so large relative to country 2 that it
dominates markets sufficiently to preclude significant deviations from
equation (1).
4. See Aliber (1973, 1975) and Frenkel and Levich (1975).
5. Loopesko (1983)reports strong rejection of the eps joint hypothesis
based on tests using pre—tax daily data for six currencies against the
11.8. dollar drawn from the 1975—81 sample period. Loopesko regresses
pre—tax realized profits on lagged realized profits, cumulated
intervention——no distinction appears to have been made between
sterilized and unsterilized intervention—--anI lagged spot rates. If
interventionwere non—sterilized an impact on exchange rates would
result even given perfect substitutability among assets denominated in
different currencies.
146. [he impact of a rise inon sensitivity of exchange rates to expected
future shocks is most easily seen by simply notinq that if8>1 the
effect o+ ta'. considerations, in effect, to raise b in [b/ (1+b— ) 3.
Ignoring theterm d/db[b/(1+b)] =(1i(1+b)2]which is unambiguously
positie. Effects of tax asymmetries Oflexchangerate behavior are
more fully discussed in kon (1984).
7.Large economies which tax long run realized exchange gains at capital
gains rates below income tax rates include the United States, Canada
andSreat 8ritain.Most other countries tax exchange qains like
interest earnings,as ordinary income. For more detail see
International Monetary Fund Working Paper FD/83/3 and SM/83/113.
8.Since during the postwar period, effective marginal tax rates on
ordinary income——applicable to realized short term exchange gains——
have exceeded 30 percent in the United States, it seems likely that
most 4irms would avoid realizing short term gains.The result would
be to make the constant 30 percent rate that most typically applied to
exchange gai ns.
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